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Case No. 20150270-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
RUSSELL EDWARD Y ALOWSKI, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for burglary, a second degree 
felony; threat of violence, a class B misdemeanor; and criminal mischiet a 
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
The victim broke up with Defendant on Tuesday. On Friday, 
Defendant kicked in her backdoor and bathroom door, and threatened to 
shoot up her house, rip off her shirt, beat her up, and leave her for dead 
where nobody could find her. R167:91-92, 98, 102-03. 
Police arrived about 20 minutes later to find Defendant and the 
frightened victim in the garage. The backdoor and bathroom door were 
broken. A single set of fresh footprints in the snow led from the front of the 
house to the broken backdoor. Shoe impressions from those prints and 
marks on the backdoor looked like the tread on Defendant's shoes. 
A jury convicted Defendant of burglary, making a threat of violence, 
and criminal mischief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: Rule 608(b ), Utah Rules of Evidence, excludes "extrinsic 
evidence" to prove "specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to 
attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness." But a trial court 
"may, on cross-examination," allow specific instances "to be inquired into if 
they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the 
witness." 
Defendant wanted to cross-examine the victim about (1) using a false 
name to enter the jail to visit Defendant; (2) an undated plea in abeyance to 
misdemeanor theft by deception; and (3) an uncharged 2014 arrest for 
misdemeanor theft by deception and giving a false name to a police officer. 
The trial court allowed Defendant to ask the victhn about using a false name 
to enter the jail, but precluded cross-examination on the plea in abeyance 
and uncharged arrest. 
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Was the trial court within its broad discretion under rules 608(b) and 403 to 
allow Defendant to cross-examine the victim on some, but not all, of the alleged 
specific instances of conduct? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence under rules 608 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Gomez, 2002 UT App 120, if12, 63 P.3d 72. 
Issue 2: Defendant's shoes and photos of the shoe impressions in the 
snow and on the backdoor were introduced into evidence. 
Was it an abuse of discretion to allow a forensic technician to give lay 
opinion testimony that the shoe impressions in the snow and on the victim's 
backdoor looked like the tread patterns on Defendant's shoes? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit lay opinion 
testimony under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if 31, 322 P.3d 624. 
Issue 3: The prosecutor agreed not to introduce Defendant's "prior 
acts of violence or abuse" and instructed the victim not to mention any 
prior acts. When the prosecutor asked "who broke up with whom," the 
victim replied: "We were at my house and I broke up with him. I just told 
him I couldn't do it anymore. He was constantly accusing me of things I 
wasn't doing and just constantly fighting with me. Getting violent." 
-3-
During the rest of the two-day trial, which spans nearly 300 pages of 
transcript, no one mentioned or otherwise used the "getting violent" 
comment. 
Did the victim's unsolicited, brief, vague reference to "getting violent" 
require the trial court to declare a mistrial? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's mistrial ruling is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ,J46, 27 P.3d 1133. 
4. Has Defendant shown that the cumulative effect of any errors 
requires reversal? 
Standard of Review. A jury verdict will be reversed "under the 
cumulative error doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack, 2008 
UT 49, ,J56, 191 P.3d 17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 173, 38 P.3d 
1278) ( omission in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (excluding relevant evidence for unfair prejudice, 
confusion, waste of time, or other reasons); 
Utah R. Evid. 608 (witness's character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness); 
Utah R. Evid. 701 (opinion testimony by lay witnesses). 
-4-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Two missing keys 
When they broke up, Bradi Richards and Defendant had been dating 
for about a year, although Ms. Richards had known Defendant since she 
was 15 or 16. R167:91-92. They never lived together and Ms. Richards 
never gave Defendant a key to her house or car. R167:94. 
Ms. Richards broke up with Defendant at her house on Tuesday, 
December 17, 2013. R167:92. She told him that she "couldn't do it 
anymore." R167:92. He was "constantly accusing [her] of things [she] 
wasn't doing and just constantly fighting with her." R167:92. 
Right after the breakup, Ms. Richardson could not find her house key 
or her only car key. R167:104-05. She believed that Defendant had taken 
them. Id. 
Two loud bangs 
Three days later, at about 10 p.m., Ms. Richards-her shirt still on-
stepped into the tub to quickly rinse off her bottom. R167:95-96. Her 
cousin, who was staying with her, was downstairs watching television with 
1Unless otherwise stated, the facts are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ,r3 n.2, 355 
P.3d 1078. 
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most of their children.2 R167:94-96, 126, 139. Ms. Richards' s six-year-old 
daughter was upstairs watching television. R167:96, 140. 
Ms. Richards had only been in the tub a few minutes when she heard 
a "loud bang." R167:97. She thought it must have been one of the children. 
R167:97, 122. A second louder bang made her open the shower curtain. She 
was surprised to find an angry Defendant standing in her bathroom. 
R167:97-98, 101, 103, 121, 123, 126. 
Defendant yelled that "he had people outside .... about eight N 
words out there waiting to shoot up the house." R167:97-98, 101, 124. He 
threatened to "rip" her shirt off. R167:99-100. And he pulled his pants 
down and urinated all over the bathroom. 3 R167:99-100, 125. 
Ms. Richards was scared. R167:99. She pleaded with Defendant to 
calm down. R167:100, 124. 
Meanwhile, downstairs, Ms. Richards' cousin had also heard the two 
loud bangs, followed by arguing. R167:139-40, 150. Frightened, the cousin 
hid in a large closet with the children until Ms. Richards' six-year-old 
2Ms. Richards had four children, ranging in ages four to nine. 
R167:95, 136-37. The cousin had her three young daughters with her, 
ranging in ages three to seven. R167:136-37. 
3The jury acquitted Defendant of a lewdness charge that was based on 
the victim's testimony that she could see Defendant's genitals while he was 
urinating. R167:99; R168:61-63; R168:83. 
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daughter caine down to say that it was just Defendant and everything was 
"okay." R167:140, 150. 
Two broken doors 
Carrying her two-year-old, the cousin went upstairs and found 
Defendant and Ms. Richards arguing. R167:100-01, 140-41. Defendant's 
demeanor changed when he saw the cousin; he wasn't yelling in quite the 
same way. R167:143-44. While Defendant talked to the cousin in the 
hallway, Ms. Richards slipped into her bedroom to call 911. R167:101. She 
set the phone down and then hung up because she was afraid Defendant 
would notice and get angry. Id. The police kept calling back and Ms. 
Richards kept hanging up, hoping that this would make them come. 
R167:102. 
Ms. Richards convinced Defendant to go outside with her so as not to 
"do this in front of the kids." Id. Once outside, Defendant said "he was 
going to take" Ms. Richards "somewhere and beat [her] up and leave [her] 
for dead where nobody could find" her. Id. 
The cousin called a friend to pick her and her children up because she 
"didn't want to have [her] kids see this." R167:103-04; 140. When the 
cousin started bringing her bags outside, Defendant began talking to her. 
-7-
R167:104, 141-43. Ms. Richards took the opportunity to answer a call from 
police and ask them to come. R167:104, 103-04. 
Defendant and the victim's cousin were still talking outside when the 
police arrived. R167:142. Defendant asked the cousin for a cigarette before 
saying, "I think I'm going to jail." Id. Defendant then walked toward Ms. 
Richards, who by now was in the garage, and asked her "to stand up for 
him." R167:104. 
Police found an upset Defendant and a scared-looking Ms. Richards 
in the garage. R167:163; R168:14. They discovered Ms. Richards' missing 
car and house keys in Defendant's pocket. R167:105, 163-64; R168:19-20. 
The police also found that both the backdoor and the bathroom door 
had been broken. R167:105-120; State's Exhibits (SE) 2-18.4 The backdoor 
looked like it had been "kicked in." R168:15. The deadbolt on the backdoor 
was "completely broken." R167:109; SE 4-6. A long crack ran through the 
door frame from about where the deadbolt was to below where the 
doorknob lock was. R167:109; SE 4, 46, 48. The door jamb on the inside was 
pulled away from the wall. R168:15-16; SE 4,5. The molding was destroyed. 
R168:15; SE 4,5. The outer backdoor also had what looked like pry marks, 
one across from the deadbolt and one across from the doorknob. R167:191-
4Photos of the two broken doors are in Addendum B. 
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95. Officers could not tell whether the pry marks were recent. R167:195. No 
one found an implement on Defendant that could have made the pry marks. 
R167:191-92. 
The bathroom door also looked like it had been forced open. R168:15. 
The door jamb was broken, the latch plate was off, and the molding was 
pulled away from the wall. R168:15; SE 13-17. 
The victim and her cousin testified that neither door had been 
damaged before Defendant arrived that night. R167:105-06, 141, 145. 
One set of footprints 
Police also found a single set of fresh footprints in the snow, leading 
from the front of the garage to the back of the house and up the steps to the 
backdoor. R167:166-67; RSE19-23. They found what looked like a partial 
shoe print on the backdoor. R167:180; SE 43-45. 
The tread on Defendant's shoes looked like the partial shoe print on 
the backdoor and like the shoe impressions in the snowy footprints leading 
to the backdoor. R167:174-83; R167:207-10; SE 25, 35, 45. 5 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with one count of burglary of a dwelling, a 
second degree felony; one count of lewdness, a class B misdemeanor; one 
5Photos of the marks on the backdoor and of some of the shoe 
impressions in the snow are in Addendum C. 
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count of threat of violence, a class B misdemeanor; and one count of 
criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor. Rl-3. 
The victim, her cousin, responding police officers, and a forensic 
technician testified at Defendant's two-day jury trial. R167:90-216; R168:11-
27. The State introduced several exhibits, including Defendant's shoes and 
photographs of the damaged doors, the victim's key found in Defendant's 
pocket, and the shoe impressions found in the snow and on the backdoor. 
R167:106-20, 169, 199. 
Defendant did not testify and called no witnesses. R168:27. His 
defense in closing was that the victim had a motive to fabricate the 
allegations because of "a bad breakup" and a desire to get Defendant "in 
trouble" because she wanted her keys back. R168:73. In support, Defendant 
argued that the victim couldn't be believed because she was dishonest- as 
shown by her using "someone else's ID. R168:69-70. Defendant also argued 
that the victim couldn't be believed because of perceived discrepancies in 
her story and because no physical evidence supported her testimony that he 
urinated all over the bathroom. R168:69-73. 
The jury convicted Defendant of burglary, threat of violence, and 
criminal mischief, but acquitted him on the lewdness charge. R101; 
R168:82-83. 
-10-
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The trial court sentenced Defendant to 1-to-15 years in prison on the 
burglary conviction, and to two consecutive jail terms of six months each on 
the two misdemeanor convictions. R45-46. The court gave Defendant one 
year credit for time served on the jail sentences. R45-46. 
Defendant timely appealed. R145; R153. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
under rules 608(b) and 403 when it allowed him to cross-examine the victim 
about using a false name to visit him, but barred him from cross-examining 
her about a dismissed plea in abeyance to theft by deception and a recent 
arrest for theft by deception and giving a false name to police. 
This Court may easily dispose of this claim on harmlessness grounds. 
Contrary to Defendant's clain1, this case did not turn on the victim's 
credibility. The cousin's testimony and the unrefuted physical evidence 
fully corroborated the victim's testimony concerning each of the crimes 
Defendant was convicted of. And Defendant was allowed to challenge the 
victim's credibility by cross-examining her on inconsistencies in her story 
and on her using a false identification to visit Defendant. Under these 
circumstances, hearing that Defendant had a prior dismissed plea in 
abeyance and an arrest that never led to charges would not have convinced 
-11-
the jury that he had not kicked in and damaged two doors and threatened 
the victim. 
The trial court's 608(b) and rule 403 ruling were not an abuse of 
discretion in any event. While relevant to the victim's general character for 
truthfulness, the plea in abeyance and arrest were-at most-only 
marginally probative of whether the victim was telling the truth here. As 
stated, the victim's credibility was not a crucial issue because all her 
testimony relating to Defendant's convictions was corroborated by her 
cousin and the unrefuted physical evidence. The trial court was therefore 
within its discretion to decide that any probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice and for confusing the 
issues. 
This Court should not reach Defendant's unpreserved rule 608(c) 
claim because he only nominally argues plain error. But he hasn't shown 
plain error, in any event, where the plea in abeyance and arrest were 
irrelevant to showing the victim's bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent. 
Point II. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly allowed 
the forensic technician to give lay opinion under rule 701 that the tread 
patterns in the shoe impressions in the snow and on the backdoor were 
similar to the tread patterns on Defendant's shoes. Defendant can show no 
-12-
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harm, however, because a responding officer gave materially similar 
testimony that Defendant did not object to and does not challenge on 
appeal. 
Defendant also can show no abuse of discretion where, in State v. 
Ellis, the Utah Supreme Court approved nearly identical lay opinion 
comparing muddy footprints. Like the testimony in Ellis, the testimony 
required no specialized knowledge, but merely pointed out similarities 
between the footprints and Defendant's shoes. This testimony was proper 
because it 1nerely drew an inference that would be readily drawn by anyone 
who saw the shoes and the shoe impressions. 
And the jury had both the shoes and the impressions to compare for 
themselves. Because the technician did not purport to base his comparison 
on any scientific methodology, the jury was unlikely to give his comparison 
greater weight than its own. 
Point III. Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted a 
mistrial after the victiln volunteered that she broke up with Defendant 
because he "was constantly accusing me of things I wasn't doing and just 
constantly fighting with me. Getting violent." Defendant argues that this 
violated the parties' pre-trial stipulation to exclude evidence of Defendant's 
prior acts of abuse against the victim. 
-13-
The trial court was well within its discretion to deny a mistrial based 
on the brief, unsolicited, and vague comment about violence. The 
prosecutor tried to talk over the comment and then immediately tried to 
change the subject. In the two-day trial spanning nearly 300 pages, no one 
ever mentioned the comment or tried to use it. Given that and the 
overwhelming physical evidence supporting Defendant's guilt, it is unlikely 
that the two words had any effect on the jury's verdict. 
Point IV. Defendant cannot show cumulative error where he has not 
shown that any error occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION 
UNDER RULE 608(B) TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
THE VICTIM ON SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE ALLEGED SPECIFIC 
INSTANCES OF DISHONEST CONDUCT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion under rules 
608(b) and rule 403 when it allowed him to cross-examine the victim about 
using a false name to visit him, but barred him from cross-examining her 
about a prior plea in abeyance to theft by deception and a recent arrest for 
theft by deception and giving a false name to police. Br. Aplt. 10-12. For the 
first time on appeal, Defendant adds that the trial court also should have 
allowed the cross-examination under rule 608(c), which allows examination 
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on bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent. Defendant asserts that 
limiting his cross-examination of the victim "implicates" his constitutional 
right to confrontation and thus requires the State to show harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt. 10-11, 21-27. 
Whether or not the trial court should have allowed the additional 
cross-examination under rules 608(b), 608(c), or 403, this Court should 
affirm because on this record any error was easily harmless- even beyond a 
reasonable doubt. And even if it were not, Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court's slight limitation on the victim's cross-examination was an 
abuse of the court's broad discretion under rules 608(b) or 403. The same is 
true for Defendant's unpreserved rule 608(c) argument, which this Court 
should not reach because Defendant has not properly argued a preservation 
exception. 
A. Proceedings below. 
This issue arose when the State filed a pretrial motion to exclude 
evidence and questions about the victim's criminal history. R60-66. The 
State sought to exclude misdemeanor convictions for retail theft and drug 
possession under rule 609 (impeachn1ent by evidence of a criminal 
conviction), rule 402 (relevance), and rule 403 (excluding relevant evidence 
for unfair prejudice). R62-64. 
-15-
On the morning of trial, the defense countered with a request to cross-
examine the victim on "three specific instances of prior dishonesty" under 
rule 608: (1) using a false name to enter the jail to visit Defendant; (2) a 
dismissed plea in abeyance to theft by deception; and (3) a 2014 arrest for 
theft by deception and giving a false name to a police officer. R167:10. In a 
clear reference to rule 403, the defense explained that the trial court would 
also "have to decide the probative value of the proper testimony, the danger 
of unfair prejudice, and then the traditional balancing test." R167:10-11. 
The defense then argued that the specific instances were not "unfairly 
prejudicial" because "two out of three of these are fairly recent. They 
involve lying to the jail, they involve lying to the police, they involve acts of 
deception with the intent to gain something." R167:11. The defense 
acknowledged that it would be "stuck" if the victim denied the specific 
instances. R167:11. 
The defense proffered no details about either the plea in abeyance or 
the 2014 arrest. On the plea in abeyance, the defense proffered only that it 
had been dismissed. R167:11. The defense proffered no date on the plea, 
although it was apparently not as recent as the two other instances. See 
R167:11 (counsel referring to other two instances as "fairly recent"). On the 
arrest, the defense proffered only that it happened after the charged 
-16-
.. 
• 
" 
" 
offenses- in June 2014- and that they had not yet "had a chance to get any 
police reports or anything else" on it, although they did have a probable 
cause statement from when the victim was booked into jail. R167:15. The 
defense did not proffer what was in that statement. R167:15. 
The prosecutor expressed concern that the victim's continuing contact 
with Defendant after the offenses was irrelevant and that examining the 
victim about her visit to Defendant would improperly inform the jury that 
Defendant was in jail. R167:11-12. The prosecutor also noted that although 
the arrest had occurred in June 2014 (six months earlier), no charges had 
ever been filed. R167:11. The prosecutor objected to examination on the 
plea in abeyance and 2014 arrest essentially because neither rose to the level 
of a conviction, let alone a felony. R167:10-11. 
The defense countered that was why it was invoking rule 608 instead 
of rule 609. Unlike rule 609, which applies only to convictions, rule 608 
"allows examples of conduct probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness 
which included the use of a false identity, attempting to corrupt or cheat 
others, attempting to deceive or defraud others." R167:10. 
The defense assured the trial court that the purpose of asking the 
victim about using a false identity to visit Defendant was "just to show her 
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act of deception." R167:14. The defense did not plan to mention that the 
visit was at the jail. R167:14. 
The trial court granted the defense motion II as far as asking the 
complaining witness about a visit using false identification." R167:15. But 
it denied II the request to bring up the plea in abeyance or the charge that 
hasn't yet been filed." R167:15. 
Defendant cross-examined the victim about inconsistencies between 
her trial and preliminary hearing testimony, e.g., R167:124; about details 
included in her trial testimony, but not her preliminary hearing testimony, 
e.g., R167:122, 125; and about gaps in her memory, see, e.g., R167:126-27, 128. 
Defendant's last question to the victim was whether there was II a 
point where you had contact with [Defendant] after these charges were filed 
where you ... used someone else's information or pretended to be someone 
else in order to have that contact?" The victim answered, "Yes. I used my 
sister's ID." R167:131. 
In closing, the defense argued that the victim's testimony could not be 
believed as a matter of "common sense." R168:68-69. In support, the 
defense pointed to the victim's wearing a shirt while taking a bath, no one 
seeing or smelling urine in the bathroom, and to the pry mar ks on the 
backdoor, which, according to Defendant, belied the victiln' s testimony that 
-18-
' 
II 
• 
the backdoor had no prior damage. R168:69-73. The defense also argued 
that the victim couldn't be believed because using "someone else's ID" to 
communicate with Defendant showed that the victim was dishonest. 
R168:69-70. Finally, the defense argued that the "bad breakup" gave the 
victim a "motive to fabricate this, to get someone in trouble when you are 
angry at them, when you want your keys back." R168:72-73. 
B. A rule 608 ruling is reversed only when the trial court so 
abused its discretion that an injustice likely resulted. 
Rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, excludes "extrinsic evidence" to 
prove "specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support 
the witness's character for truthfulness." But it allows specific instances of 
conduct to be inquired into on cross-examination if they are probative of a 
witness' character for truthfulness: 
Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal 
conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible 
to prove specific instances of a wih1ess' s conduct in order to 
attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But 
the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired 
into if they are probative of the character for h·uthfulness or 
untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-
examined has testified about. 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis added). 
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Under this rule, "no party is entitled to inquire of a witness's prior bad 
acts." State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, ~9, 141 P.3d 614. Rather, the trial 
court is "afforded broad discretion to allow or disallow inquiry concerning 
the witness's prior bad acts, even if probative of the witness's truthfulness or 
untruthfulness." Id. (Emphasis added). See also State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 
~12, 63 P.3d 72 (trial court "has broad discretion in restricting the scope of 
cross-examination"). Thus, it is not enough to show that the evidence was 
probative of a witness's truthfulness or untruthfulness and that a h·ial court 
would be within its discretion to allow cross-examination. A defendant must 
show that it was outside the court's discretion to deny the cross-examination. 
This Court has held that a trial court's discretion under rule 608(b ), 
" [ s ]pecifically," includes the "discretion . . . to exclude evidence of 
previously dismissed criminal charges against the witness." Valdez, 2006 
UT 290, i112 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
And even if specific instances might technically be admissible under 
rule 608(b), cross-examination of a witness's character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness "may still be limited or prohibited by the trial court in its 
sound discretion under rule 403." Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ~33. 
A trial court's ruling under rules 608(b) and 403 is not reversed 
"unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is 
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a likelihood that injustice resulted." Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ,r12 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, Defendant must also 
show that prohibiting him from asking the victim about the dismissed plea 
in abeyance and an arrest that never resulted in charges prejudiced him. See 
id.; State v. Aleh, 2015 UT App 195, ,I,Il9, 28 , 357 P.3d 12 (affirming trial 
court's rule 608(b) ruling because Aleh had not shown prejudice). To prove 
that, Defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different outcome 
if he had been allowed to ask about the plea in abeyance and arrest. Aleh, 
2015 UT App 195, ,I,Il 9. 
Defendant argues that because the trial court's rule 608(b) ruling 
11 implicates" his II constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-
examination," this Court must reverse unless it finds the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt. 21-22. Defendant's argument 
mistakenly assumes that II a violation of an evidentiary rule equals a 
constitutional violation." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987). 
But the Utah Supreme Court has held- in the rule 608(b) context- that it 
does not: 11 the evidentiary standards and the constitutional guarantee are 
not and ought not to be entirely coextensive." Id. Cf Aleh, 2015 UT App 
195, i1ii19-28 (assuming "evidentiary error II in rule 608(b) ruling and 
applying ordinary prejudice standard). Defendant has not shown that the 
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modest limits placed on his cross-examination of the victim amounted to a 
denial of his constitutional right to confrontation, as opposed to a run-of-
the-mill evidentiary error. But even if he had, those limits were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
C. Any error in the trial court's rule 608(b) ruling was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This Court may easily dispose of this claim on harmlessness grounds. 
See Aleh, 2015 UT App 195, if19 (affirming 608(b) ruling limiting cross-
exam.ination on lack of prejudice alone). 
At bottom, Defendant's prejudice argument rests on the premise that 
the State's case turned on the victim's credibility. Br. Aplt. 22-27. According 
to Defendant, "little" corroborated the victim's testimony, "and the State's 
case was not otherwise strong." Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant acknowledges that 
he was allowed to cross-examine the victim about using a false name to visit 
him, but argues this was not enough to "expose" the victim's "motive to lie 
and [to] reveal her incapacity for truthfulness." Br. Aplt. 25. 
In fact, the State's case neither rose nor fell on the victim's credibility. 
The unrefuted physical evidence and other witnesses fully corroborated the 
victim's testimony concerning each of the crimes Defendant was convicted 
of- burglary, threat of violence, and criminal mischief. Both the victim and 
the cousin heard two loud bangs just before Defendant appeared in the 
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house. R167:97, 122, 139-40. Both testified that upon entering the home, 
Defendant yelled at the victim upstairs. R167:97-98, 101, 124, 139-40, 150. 
The cousin was frightened enough by the loud bangs and Defendant's 
yelling that she hid in a closet with the children. R167:140, 150. And the 
victim was frightened enough to call 911. R167:101-04. 
Photos of the extensive damage to the backdoor and bathroom door 
corroborated the victim's and cousin's testimony of the two loud bangs. See 
Addendum B. Both the victim and her cousin testified that the damage had 
not been there before Defendant appeared that night. R167:105-06, 141, 145. 
Fresh shoe impressions in the snow and marks on the backdoor looked like 
the h·ead on Defendant's shoes. R167:166-67, 174-83, 207-10. And police 
arrived to find Defendant still there, the victim looking frightened, and the 
missing house and car keys in Defendant's pocket. R167:105, 163-64; 
R168:14, 19-20. 
The loud bangs, the newly broken doors, Defendant's yelling and 
threatening behavior, and Defendant's shoe impressions all corroborated 
the victim's testimony that Defendant had entered her home without her 
permission (burglary), that he threatened her (threat of violence), and that 
he broke her two doors (criminal mischief). 
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In light of this unrefuted corroborating evidence, asking the victim 
about a dismissed plea in abeyance and about an arrest for theft by 
deception that never resulted in charges would not have convinced the jury 
that she was lying about whether Defendant had her permission to be in her 
home or whether he had threatened her. The jury's acquittal on lewdness -
the one count supported solely by the victim's uncorroborated testimony-
supports this conclusion. 
Moreover, this is not a case where Defendant was denied any 
opportunity to challenge the victim's credibility. While Defendant could 
not ask about the plea in abeyance or the uncharged arrest, he was allowed 
to ask about using a false name to contact Defendant. And he argued that 
this incident made the victim unworthy of belief. R168:169-70. He also 
cross-examined the victim about apparent discrepancies in her story and 
inconsistencies with her prior testimony. 
While the Defendant may have wanted more, he was not entitled to 
unlimited cross-examination. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ,T31, 57 P.3d 
220 (right to cross-examine not unlimited). Certainly, he has not shown on 
this record that allowing him incremental cross-examination about a 
dismissed plea in abeyance and an uncharged arrest would have made the 
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jury disregard the unrefuted evidence corroborating her story. This Court 
should affirm the trial court for this reason alone. 
D. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to preclude 
cross-examination on a dismissed plea in abeyance and an 
uncharged arrest. 
The trial court's 608 ruling was well within its discretion in any event. 
On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling under rules 608(b), 
608(c), and 403. Br. Aplt. 12-20. Defendant has not shown that the trial 
court stepped outside its discretion under rules 608(b) and 403. This Court 
should not reach Defendant's rule 608(c) argument because it is 
unpreserved and he only nominally argues plain error. But even if this 
Court reaches the issue, Defendant has shown no abuse of discretion under 
that rule either. 
1. The trial court was well within its discretion under 
rules 608(b) and 403. 
As stated, a trial court has broad discretion "to allow or disallow 
inquiry" in to a witness's prior bad acts under rule 608(b), even when 
probative of the witness's truthfulness or unh·uthfulness. Valdez, 2006 UT 
App 290, i-/9. See also Gomez, 2002 UT 120, i-/12. This is because evidence 
admissible under rule 608(b) "may still be limited or prohibited by the trial 
court in its sound discretion under rule 403." Gomez, 2002 UT 120, i-/33. 
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The "'court's job,"' in "the interplay of rules 608(b) and 403," is '"to 
balance the probative value of specific-instances evidence against the 
potential dangers and costs of that evidence."' Id. at if34 (quoting 28 
Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Evidence§ 6118, at 94 (1993)). The court does this by evaluating "the extent 
to which the proposed testimony is probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness" and "the degree to which the proffered testimony may tend 
to inflame or prejudice the jury," and then balancing those concerns to 
decide "whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
testimony's probative value." Id. at if 33. 
Assessing the "degree of probative value" is "a function of several 
factors," such as, "the relative importance of the [witness's] credibility"; 
"the extent to which the evidence is probative of other relevant matters"; 
"the extent to which the circumstances surrounding the specific instances of 
conduct are similar to the circumstances surrounding" the witness's 
testimony; "the remoteness in time of the specific instances to trial"; and 
"the likelihood that the alleged specific instances of conduct in fact 
occurred." Id. at if35. 
The trial court here did not expressly do a rule 403 balancing on the 
record, although Defendant's 403 argument shows that the court considered 
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it. R167:10-11 (defense argumg that trial court would need to balance 
probative value against danger of unfair prejudice) . But even without a rule 
403 balancing on the record, this Court may "still affirm if [it] can find some 
basis in the record for concluding that the trial court's action falls within the 
limits of permissible discretion under Rule 403." State v. Hackford, 737 P .2d 
200, 204 (Utah 1987). Such a basis is in this record. 
First, the dismissed plea in abeyance and uncharged arrest had 
minimal probative value to whether the victim was telling the truth here. 
As explained, the victim's credibility was not a crucial issue where her 
testimony on the convicted counts was fully corroborated by unrefuted 
physical evidence and her cousin's testimony. Thus, while a theft by 
deception and giving a false name for a police officer might be relevant to 
the victim's general character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, it was only 
marginally relevant to whether she was telling the truth here. Also, the 
defense proffer about the plea in abeyance and the arrest was too vague to 
say whether they involved specific instances of conduct similar to the 
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circumstances here. 6 And while the arrest was six months before trial, 
Defendant never proffered when the dismissed plea in abeyance was. 
Finally, given that the arrest never resulted in charges, the trial court could 
have reasonably viewed it as a mere allegation of misconduct. See Valdez, 
2006 UT App 290, ,r16 (" the probative value of the circumstances 
surrounding [the victim's] dismissed charge is negligible in light of other 
similar impeachment evidence and because a dis1nissed charge is merely an 
allegation of misconduct"); see also Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ,r35 (likelihood that 
alleged specific instance of conduct in fact occurred relevant to degree of 
probative value). 
Second, the evidence's minimal probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusing the issues. See 
Utah R. Evid. 403. Given the strong corroborating evidence, it was unlikely 
to have any effect other than to embarrass the victim and to distract the jury 
from the real issue: whether Defendant broke into her home and threatened 
her. 
6Defendant bore the burden below to proffer sufficient information 
for the trial court to assess the probative value of the evidence. Aleh, 2015 
UT App 195, ,r24 (under rules of evidence, "a party may claim error in a 
ruling excluding evidence only if, among other things, that 'party informs 
the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was 
apparent from the context"') (quoting Utah R. Evid. 103(a)). His failure to 
do so counts against him, not the h·ial court. Id. 
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This case is much like State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, where the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court was well within its discretion to 
preclude questioning into a rape victim's alleged use of a false identification 
card to engage in underage drinking. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, i1i17, 33-36. The 
supreme court agreed with the trial court that any probative value was 
"fairly low" and that it was outweighed by "the potential of the testimony 
to inflame the jury and distract them from the real issue in the case," which 
was the rape charge against Gomez and the victim's credibility. Id. at i136. 
This case is an even easier call than Gomez was. Unlike here, Gomez's 
guilt turned on whether the jury believed the victim when she said she did 
not consent. Id. at i1i11-5, 7. If it was not an abuse of discretion to limit 
cross-examination on the use of a false identification when the victim's 
credibility is the sole issue, it cannot be an abuse of discretion to limit cross-
examination on a dismissed plea in abeyance and an uncharged arrest for 
theft by deception when the victim's credibility is not the sole issue. 
This case is also like State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 290. The trial court there 
would not allow Valdez to question the rape victim about a dismissed 
charge of false information. Id. at i1i18-17. Like in Gomez, and unlike here, 
Valdez's case turned largely on the victim's credibility. Id. at i110. This 
Court nevertheless held that the trial court was well within its discretion to 
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exclude the dismissed charge, partly because Valdez was allowed to 
impeach the victim with a prior forgery conviction, but also because the 
probative value of a "dismissed charge is negligible," where it is "merely an 
allegation of misconduct." Id. at i-116. Again, if a trial court is within its 
discretion to limit cross-examination on a dismissed charge of false 
information when the victim's credibility is the crucial issue, it must also be 
within its discretion to limit cross-examination on a dismissed plea in 
abeyance and an arrest for theft by deception when the victim's credibility 
is not the crucial issue. This is particularly true where, like Valdez, 
Defendant was allowed to inquire into another specific instance of 
conduct-using a false identification. 
2. This Court should not reach Defendant's unpreserved 
rule 608(c) argument where he only nominally asserts 
plain error. 
As stated, Defendant also argues that the victim's plea in abeyance 
and arrest were admissible under rule 608(c). Br. Aplt. 17-18. That rule 
states that "[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by exa1nination of the witness or by other 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 608(c). Defendant argues that the victim's 
dismissed plea in abeyance and uncharged arrest were "highly probative of 
her motive to testify falsely ." Br. Aplt. 17. 
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Defendant did not preserve his rule 608(c) claim below. While 
Defendant cited generally to rule 608, he confined his argument to the 
language of rule 608(b). R167:10-11. He spoke only in terms of "specific 
instances" of prior dishonesty and "examples of conduct probative of 
h·uthfulness or untruthfulness." R167:10-11. He never uttered the words in 
rule 608( c): "bias," "prejudice," or "motive to misrepresent." And he 
expressly invoked State v. Gomez, which addressed only rule 608(b). 
R167:10-11. 
To obtain review of an unpreserved claim, a defendant must show 
plain error. See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,I21, 167 P.3d 1046. Here, 
Defendant only nominally argues that the trial court plainly erred under 
rule 608. Br. Aplt. 27-28. His two-paragraph plain error argument does no 
more than set out the plain error standard and then assert that the alleged 
error "was obvious in light of case law stressing the importance of cross-
examination and emphasizing that 'the scope of cross-examination as to 
credibility ... must be broad."' Br. Aplt. 28 ( quoting State v. Leonard, 707 
P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985)). His argument, however, ignores the case law 
stating that the right to cross-examine is not unlimited and that a trial court 
has broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on it. See, e.g., State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 87, if31; State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987). 
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Defendant also does not even bother to separate his rule 608(b) and 608(c) 
arguments in this section, even though the require1nents are very different. 
This is reason alone to disregard Defendant's rule 608(c) argument. See 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,121 (unpreserved argument must be briefed through 
lens of exception to preservation rule). 
Defendant cannot show plain error anyway because, as explained, he 
hasn't shown prejudice. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,115, 95 P.3d 263 
(plain error requires appellant to show obvious, prejudicial error). He also 
cannot show obvious error because nothing in the previously dismissed 
plea in abeyance or the uncharged arrest showed any bias against 
Defendant or a motive to fabricate the charges against him. Nothing in 
Defendant's proffer on either specific instance suggests any connection 
between Defendant and the victim's accusations in this case. 
Defendant asserts that the victim's "acts of misconduct reveal her 
willingness to lie to the police and others by falsely incriminating 
[Defendant] based on her own ill-feelings and self-interests." Br. Aplt. 17. 
But while theft by deception and giving a false name to police might show a 
willingness to lie for personal gain or to escape punishment, they say 
nothing about a willingness "to falsely accuse" Defendant "based on ill-
feelings." Id. 
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Defendant suggests that the 2014 arrest in particular gave the victim 
"a motive for favoring the prosecution in her testimony." Br. Aplt. 18. 
Defendant speculates that because the arrest happened after his offenses 
and "relatively close" to trial, the victim" could have believed that testifying 
favorably for the prosecution would minimize the threat of being charged 
with the misconduct for which she was arrested." Id. Defendant forgets that 
a month before the arrest, the victim had already testified favorably for the 
prosecution at preliminary hearing. See R20. The subsequent arrest, 
therefore, was not an incentive for her to testify favorably for the 
prosecution or to fabricate the charges against Defendant in the first 
instance. 
In sum, it is plain from this record that the modest limits on 
Defendant's cross-examination did not prejudice Defendant's trial. 
Defendant also has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in 
limiting his cross-examination under rules 608 and 403. 
II. 
IT WAS WELL WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION UNDER 
RULE 701 TO ALLOW A FORENSIC TECHNICIAN TO GIVE LAY 
OPINION THAT SHOE IMPRESSIONS IN THE SNOW AND ON THE 
VICTIM'S BROKEN BACKDOOR LOOKED LIKE THE TREAD 
PATTERNS ON DEFENDANT'S SHOES 
Defendant argues that the forensic technician's testimony comparing 
the shoe impressions in the snow and on the backdoor to the tread on 
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Defendant's shoes was improper lay opinion under rule 701, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Br. Aplt. 29-31. Rule 701 limits lay opinion testimony to an 
opinion that is "(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful 
to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in 
issue; and ( c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Defendant argues that the 
technician's testimony was unhelpful and required "specialized 
knowledge." Br. Aplt. 30-36. 
As a threshold matter, Defendant ca1mot show he was harmed by the 
technician's testimony because he has not challenged the admission of 
substantially the same testimony from one of the responding police officers. 
Further, the jury had both the shoes and the impressions to compare for 
themselves. Because the technician did not purport to base his comparison 
on any scientifically methodology, the jury was unlikely to give his 
comparison greater weight than its own. And the trial court was well 
within its discretion to allow the forensic technician to testify that the shoe 
impressions looked like Defendant' s shoe tread; in fact that testimony fell 
squarely within the evidence rule 701 permits. 
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A. Proceedings below. 
Before jury selection, the defense objected to anticipated "testimony 
from one of the police officers that shoe prints match [Defendant's] 
footwear." R167:9. The defense objected "because we believe that's 
appropriate for an expert under 702 and [not] a lay witness." Id. The judge 
said that he would wait to rule until he heard what the witness said, but 
initially thought "that a layperson could say something to the effect that 
'That footprint looks a lot like his shoe."' R167:9-10. The court did agree 
with the defense that if the witness was "going to say, 'I've done an expert 
examination, I've matched tread: and so forth, then he probably couldn't go 
that far." R167:10. 
Officer Fausett's testimony. Officer Fausett testified to discovering the 
fresh set of footprints leading around the house to the backdoor. R167:166-
67. He had forensic technician Alan Kalinowski take photos of the 
footprints and the backdoor. R167:166-67, 178, 182. The photos of the shoe 
impressions were all received into evidence without objection during 
Officer Fausett's testimony. R167:169; SE 19-50. 
Officer Fausett then walked the jury through the photos of the 
footprints. R167:169-83. He showed the jury how some of the close-ups of 
the footprints-particularly State's Exhibits 25 and 35-showed head 
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patterns. R167:173-75. Officer Fausett pointed out some distinctive features 
in the tread patterns shown in the photos and on Defendant's shoes: "So 
right here there's flat, round, circular. And then around it several small 
circle lines. Right here is a void in the shoe, so an indent. On the top of it 
closest to the toes is somewhat curved." R167:174. Officer Fausett pointed 
out "additional detail on the shoe print" that could be seen on State's 
Exhibit 35: "It's little side lines that are going to be on the side of the shoe 
right in here .... Small lines that are next to a little void in the middle," that 
"look[ed] like" they "would be on the inside edge of the shoe." R167:178. 
Officer Fausett testified that these additional markings were 
"significant" because "they're going to match a mark that we can see on the 
door as well as match-." R167:178-79. The defense immediately objected to 
"the terminology of 'matching."' R167:179. The trial court sustained the 
objection and struck that testhnony. Id. 
Officer Fausett then testified without objection that the shoe 
impressions and shoe tread were "similar": "Similar to marks that we can 
see on the photograph, on the door, as well as on the shoes" that Defendant 
was wearing. R167:179. Officer Fausett also testified that the "white 
marks" on the backdoor were "similar to the ones in size and shape" as the 
shoe impressions in the snow. R167:180-82. Officer Fausett testified that he 
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had Defendant show him the bottom of his shoes the night he was arrested. 
R167:183. Defendant's shoes were taken from him at jail and booked into 
evidence. R167:197-99. 
Other than Officer Fausett' s saymg "match" in a single sentence, 
Defendant did not object to anything in Officer Fausett's testimony. 
Forensic technician Kalinowski' s testimony. After Officer Fausett 
testified, the court asked the prosecution in a sidebar conference what the 
technician would offer "that we haven't already heard." R167:196. "You do 
what you want," the court said, "but does he have something significant?" 
Id. The prosecution said he did, but promised he would be "quick." Id. 
Forensic technician Kalinowski testified that he took all the police 
photos at the scene, including those of the shoe prints in the snow and on 
the backdoor. R167:202-10. The technician compared the tread pattern in 
the photos to Defendant's shoes: "On the tread pattern, this similar pattern, 
similar block. Identical." R167:207-08. The technician showed how a 
similar block or "cutup" of the shoes was "consistent with the same cutup" 
in the shoe impression. R167:208-09. The technician also pointed out details 
found in both the shoes and the shoe impressions: "On this pattern it came 
out with this small spot right here .... Small indent in the heel of the shoe 
similar to the indent of the shoe impression in the snow." R167:209. 
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The technician also compared the shoe's tread patterns to the partial 
shoe impression on the backdoor: "This picture here struck me very odd to 
see because there's not much of a shoe impression on the top, however, you 
can see down - down the side here you have the same, similar block cut 
pattern on the side of the shoe indicating more of an angled hit towards the 
door. Therefore, you wouldn't see much of the shoe itself but more of the 
side of the shoe." R167:209-10. 
The technician did not measure the patterns or testify that they 
"matched." R167:216. On cross-examination, the technician confirmed that 
he was not testifying as an expert, but only "as the person who gathered 
this evidence." R167:212. 
B. Defendant's failure to challenge the admission of similar lay 
opinion by another witness is fatal to his claim. 
On appeal, Defendant challenges only the admission of the 
technician's shoe impression testimony, but not Officer Fausett' s 
substantially similar testimony. Br. Aplt. 29-36. Because Defendant does not 
challenge the admission of essentially the same testimony through another 
witness, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by the technician's 
testimony. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah 1989) (no prejudice 
where challenged testimony was "merely cumulative" of unchallenged 
evidence); State v. High, 2012 UT App 180, ,is1, 282 P.3d 1046 (admission of 
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challenged gang evidence harmless where jury "would still have heard 
unchallenged and properly admitted gang evidence); State v. Lyman, 2001 
UT App 67U, *1 (no prejudice "where jury heard evidence from Defendant's 
father concerning this exact issue and further evidence would have been 
cumulative"). 
While the technician's shoe impression testimony was longer than 
Officer Fausett' s, the substance and import of the two testimonies were the 
same. Both described distinctive patterns in the shoe impressions in the 
snow and on the door. R167:174-83, 207-10. Both compared the shoe 
impressions in the snow and on the door to the tread patterns on 
Defendant's shoes. Id. Both opined that the tread patterns in the snow and 
on the door looked "similar" to and "consistent" with Defendant's shoes. 7 
Id. Indeed, Officer Fausett's shoe impression testimony prompted the trial 
court to question whether the prosecution even needed to call the forensic 
technician. See R167:196 (asking whether technician would offer anything 
significant that they hadn't already heard). 
7 As explained below, while the technician once used the word 
"identical," his overall testimony makes clear that he was not purporting to 
"match" the tread patterns; rather, he repeatedly used the words "similar" 
and "consistent." R167:208-10. 
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Thus, even if the technician's shoe impression testimony were 
improper, Defendant cannot show that he was harmed by its admission 
because it was merely cumulative of the officer's similar unchallenged 
testimony. 
C. Testimony pointing out visual similarities between the shoe 
impressions and Defendant's shoes without purporting to 
rely on scientific method falls squarely within the lay 
opinion testimony that rule 701 permits 
Rule 701 limits lay opinion testimony to that which is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or 
to determining a fact in issue; and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
Defendant does not dispute that the technician's testimony was based 
on his perception. Br. Aplt. 29-31. He argues instead that the comparison 
testimony was unhelpful because it "told the jury what result to reach and 
[it] rested on unfounded assumptions." Br. Aplt. 31-32. He alternatively 
argues that it was inadmissible because it was based on specialized 
knowledge that only an expert could testify to. Br. Aplt. 34-36. 
1. State v. Ellis approved nearly identical lay opinion 
testimony comparing muddy footprints. 
The Utah Supreme Court decided both Defendant's arguments 
against him in State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). There, a security 
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guard "compared" two sets of muddy footprints outside a broken window 
to one set of muddy footprints in the house. Id. at 190. He opined that a 
photograph of a footprint "with the distinctive heel marking appeared to be 
the one on the inside of the carpet." Id. 
The Ellis court held that the footprint comparison was "helpful lay 
testimony" under rule 701. Id. at 191. And the "security guard [in Ellis] did 
not need specialized knowledge to testify that the footprints looked similar 
because that inference would be readily drawn by any person who observed 
both sets of footprints." State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, i-f35 (explaining 
Ellis, 748 P.2d at 190-91). The Ellis court further reasoned that "just because 
the similarity of footprints could have been scientifically determined and 
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confirmed in testimony by an expert," that did "not mean that an expert is 
the only witness capable of providing such testimony." 8 Id. 
2. The technician's shoe print comparison was the same as 
that given in Ellis. 
The technician's shoe impression comparison testimony was no 
different from the muddy footprint comparison in Ellis. Both pointed to 
distinctive markings in the prints and then opined that they looked similar. 
Compare Ellis, 748 P.2d at 190 (stating that photograph of outside footprint 
with "distinctive heel marking appeared to be the one on the inside of the 
carpet"), with R167:209 (pointing out "similar" semi-circular pattern in shoe 
and photo; noting " [ s ]mall indent in the heel of the shoe similar to the 
8 A number of other courts agree with Ellis that footprint comparisons 
are proper lay opinion testimony under rule 701. See, e.g., United States v. 
Shields, 480 Fed. Appx. 381,387 (6th Cir. 2012) (officer's testimony regarding 
similarities between defendant's shoe tread and photo of shoe prints at 
crime scene permissible lay opinion); State v. Haarala, 398 So.2d 1093, 1098 
(La. 1981) (officer's testimony that shoe prints at crime scene were similar to 
those made by defendant's shoes was permissible lay opinion); State v. 
Walker, 319 N.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Minn. 1982) (deputy's testimony that 
defendant's and his brother's boots made footprints at crime scene was 
permissible lay opinion); Smith v. State, 725 So.2d 922, 925-26 (Miss. Ct. App. 
1998) (officer's testimony that shoe print on kicked-in backdoor was of 
"same pattern" as sole of shoes seen at defendant's house was proper lay 
opinion); State v. Mewborn, 507 S.E.2d 906, 909-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) 
(officer's testimony comparing markings on robber's shoes in videotape to 
defendant's was permissible lay opinion); State v. Bouie, 776 S.E.2d 606, 616-
18 (W.V. 2015) (officer's testimony that shoes were similar in color and 
design to shoes worn by defendant in surveillance videos was permissible 
lay opinion). 
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indent of the shoe impression in the snow"). The Ellis court called this 
comparison "helpful lay testimony." Ellis, 748 P.2d at 191. 
Defendant tries to distinguish Ellis by arguing that the technician's 
testimony here went beyond the security guard's comparison. Br. Aplt. 32. 
Defendant first argues that the security guard in Ellis "merely 'compared 
the footprints outside the house to those inside,"' as evidenced by his words 
"appeared to be." Id. Defendant argues that the technician here essentially 
told the jury what "result to reach" when he "characteriz[ed] portions of the 
tread patterns as 'identical."' Br. Aplt. 31-32. 
It is true that the technician once used the word "identical." R167:208. 
But while the Defendant had successfully objected to Officer Fausett's use of 
the word "match," Defendant did not bother to object to the technician's use 
of "identical." R167:178-79, 208. Defendant therefore cannot now complain 
that the testimony was improper. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ,r12 (appellant 
must preserve claim to obtain appellate review). This is particularly true 
here because the trial court initially ruled that it would not allow lay 
testimony that the tread "matched" (R167:9-10), and it made good on its 
word when it later struck Officer Fausett' s use of the word on Defendant's 
objection (R167:178-79). On these facts, the only logical conclusion is that 
the trial court would have sustained an objection to and struck the 
-43-
technician's testimony using "identical" if Defendant had seen fit to make 
that objection. He did not and cannot now complain that the h·ial court did 
not correct an error he did not ask it to correct. 
But with or without that single use of "identical," the technician's 
testimony did not tell the jury what result to reach. First, it is not at all clear 
the technician's isolated "identical" meant "matched." The technician 
immediately prefaced "identical" with talk about "similar" blocks and 
patterns: "On the tread pattern, this similar pattern, similar block. 
Identical." R167:208. Thereafter, his comparisons employed only "similar" 
and "consistent." See, e.g., R167:208 ("this similar block"; "is consistent with 
the same cutup"; "same block-type pattern is consistent with"; "that similar 
pattern"; "this pattern is consistent and similar to the same shoe pattern as 
this"). 
In short, the thrust of the technician's testimony was the same as that 
in Ellis - showing how the shoe impressions "appeared to be" like the tread 
on Defendant's shoes. See Ellis, 748 P.2d at 190. Thus, the technician's 
testimony was helpful lay opinion testimony. 
Defendant also asserts that the technician's testimony improperly 
"told the jury what inference to draw from the evidence of the impression 
on the back door-that a shoe consistent with [Defendant's] Nikes 'hit' the 
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door." Br. Aplt. 32 (citing R167:209-10). Defendant argues that this 
testimony "foreclosed" the jury "from concluding that the incomplete 
impression came from a different shoe or was caused by something else 
entirely." Id. 
But here again the technician's testimony- like the security guard's in 
Ellis and the unobjected-to testimony from Fausett- merely compared the 
patterns on the partial shoe impression with the patterns on the side of 
Defendant's shoes to suggest an" angled hit": 
This picture struck me very odd to see because there's not 
much of a shoe impression on the top, however, you can see 
down-down the side here you have that same, similar, block 
cut pattern on the side of the shoe indicating more of an angled 
hit towards the door. 
R167:209-10. Far from telling the jury what to decide, the technician merely 
showed the jury how "similar" the patterns on the sides of Defendant's 
shoes were to the markings on the door. The technician's inference that this 
"indicat(ed]" that the shoe struck the door at an angle was proper under 
rule 701 because the inference was one that "would be readily drawn by any 
person who observed both" the shoes and the photos. Rothlisberger, 2006 
UT 49, ~35. 
Defendant alternatively argues that the comparison testimony was 
unhelpful because it rested on "unfounded assumptions" and "unsound 
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methodology" and had the potential to confuse the jury. Br. Aplt. 32-33. 
But there was no methodology to the technician's testimony. Like the 
security guard's testimony in Ellis, the technician merely pointed to 
similarities in the impressions and the actual shoe treads. That was merely 
an inference that any person who saw the impressions and shoes would 
make. See Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, if35. 
And in this case, the jury knew that no one expected them to 
unquestionably accept the technician's comparisons, no matter how strong 
his opinions. They knew not only that they would be able to make the 
comparisons themselves, but that it was expected of them. The prosecutor 
promised the jury that it would have an opportunity to inspect the shoes 
and photos itself. R167:208 ("You can just describe what you see and then 
I'll let the jury look at it later."). During closing, the prosecutor encouraged 
the jury to look at the photos and shoes: ''I'm not going to go through the 
whole thing now, but you've got footprints. You can look at all the pictures. 
You can look at his shoes." R168:64. And before deliberations, the trial 
court told the jury that they would have the photos and the shoes with the1n 
in the jury room and that if they wanted "to examine the shoes," the court 
would provide them "with rubber gloves" to do so. R168:51. 
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Thus, far from "foreclosing" the jury from deciding for itself, the 
technician's testimony merely drew an inference that any person seeing the 
shoes and shoe impressions would readily draw. See Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 
49, if 35. 
3. The technician's footprint comparison - like that made in 
Ellis-required no specialized knowledge. 
Defendant acknowledges that the security guard in Ellis did not need 
specialized knowledge to testify that the muddy footprints there looked 
alike because that inference "could be 'readily drawn by any person who 
observed both sets of footprints."' Br. Aplt. 35 (quoting Rothlisberger, 2006 
UT 49, i-f35). Defendant tries to distinguish Ellis again by arguing that the 
technician's testimony here was "based on observations that could not be 
readily drawn by any person who looked at the Nike sneakers and pictures 
of the shoe impressions." Br. Aplt. 35. According to Defendant, shoe 
impressions, "[b ]y their nature," are "' complex to interpret,"' and that 
"' [m]ost footwear prints have complex geometric structures."' Id. (citations 
omitted). Defendant argues that the technician's" conclusion" that" areas of 
the tread pattern were 'identical' required a degree of technical certainty" 
that even an expert lacks. Br. Aplt. 35-36. Defendant makes the same 
argument about the technician's testimony on the partial shoe impression 
on the backdoor. Br. Aplt. 36. 
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As explained, there is no real difference between the technician's 
testimony and that approved in Ellis. Like the security guard in Ellis, the 
technician here did nothing more than point out similarities in the tread 
patterns shown in the photos and Defendant's shoes-something that any 
person who saw them could see. While he once-without objection-used 
the word II identical," he thereafter used only II similar" and II consistent 
with." R167:207-10. He never opined that the shoes and impressions were a 
certain match. And his testimony about the partial shoe impression on the 
backdoor did nothing more than compare the pattern on the side of the shoe 
with the pattern appearing on the door. R167:209-10. He then drew the 
obvious inference that the mark was left by being hit by the side of the 
shoe-i.e., at an angle. 
None of this testimony required specialized knowledge. He pointed 
to no complexity in II geometric structures" to support his visual 
comparison, let alone opine that II complex geometric structures" 
scientifically linked Defendant's shoes to the prints. Rather, the technician's 
testimony-like the security guard's in Ellis-merely drew an inference that 
could be "readily drawn by any person who observed both" the shoes and 
shoe impressions. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, i135. 
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D. Defendant cannot show prejudice where the jury had both 
the shoes and the photos and could judge for itself whether 
the technician's comparison was accurate. 
Finally, Defendant cannot show prejudice for essentially the same 
reasons. The jury had the photos and shoes and could readily judge for 
itself whether the technician's testimony was accurate. And because the 
testimony did not purport to draw a conclusion based on scientific 
methodology, the jury would not likely feel compelled to give the 
witnesses' lay comparisons any greater weight than its own lay comparison. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL 
MOTION BASED ON THE VICTIM'S BRIEF, UNSOLICITED, AND 
VAGUE TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT CONSTANTLY FOUGHT 
WITH HER- "GETTING VIOLENT" 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
his mistrial motion based on the victim's testimony that she broke up with 
Defendant because he "was constantly accusing me of things I wasn't doing 
and just constantly fighting with me. Getting violent." Br. Aplt. 43. 
Defendant argues that this violated the pre-trial agreement that Defendant's 
prior acts of violence or abuse would not be admitted. Br. Aplt. 43-44. 
Defendant argues that he had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome if the jury had not heard about his" getting violent." Br. Aplt. 44. 
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Defendant cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
deciding that this "brief mention/' with no "description of any violent 
events," resulted in any "significant harm." R167:156-57. The brief, vague 
allusion to violence came at the beginning of testimony in a two-day trial 
and was never mentioned again or exploited. Under these facts, the trial 
court was well within its discretion to deny a mistrial. 
A. Proceedings below. 
The morning of trial, the parties announced that unless Defendant 
opened the door, they had agreed that "no prior acts of violence or abuse 
[by Defendant] will be admitted today." R167:8. The parties represented 
that the prosecutor had "instructed her witnesses accordingly." Id. 
The victim testified first. R167:90-91. On the second page of the 
victim's testimony, the prosecutor-referring to the breakup-asked, 
"[HJ ow did that happen? I mean, who broke up with whom?" R167:92. 
The victim replied that she broke up with Defendant at her house. Id. She 
then volunteered why she broke up with him: 
We were at my house and I broke up with him. I just 
told him I couldn't do it anymore. He was constantly accusing 
me of things I wasn't doing and just constantly fighting with 
me. Getting violent. 
Id. The prosecutor immediately asked, "You broke it up?" R167:92, 155. 
The victim answered, "I broke it up." R167:92. At this point, the defense 
-50-
• 
' 
' 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
" 
" 
objected and asked to approach. R167:92-93. In the ensuing bench 
conference, the defense moved for a mistrial because the testimony violated 
the agreement "to not discuss any prior violence." R167:93. The trial court 
reserved further argument on the motion for later. Id. 
The parties fully argued the mistrial motion after both the victim and 
her cousin testified. R167:155-57. The defense did not dispute that the 
prosecutor had instructed her witnesses on the prior bad acts agreement. 
R167:155. Indeed, the defense conceded that the victim had "volunteered" 
the challenged comment. Id. But the defense argued that whether or not 
the comment was intentionally elicited, the jury should not have heard that 
"there was violence within the relationship" and that they could not now 
"unring" it. R167:156. 
The prosecutor confirmed that she had told the victim "to not bring 
up any prior violent incidents." R167:155. But the prosecutor questioned 
whether the jury had even "really" heard the testimony because as soon as 
the prosecutor "started hearing the word [violent] come out of [ the victim's] 
mouth, the prosecutor "started talking over her," so as to prevent the jury 
from hearing the word. Id. 
The h·ial court denied the motion. R167:156. The court agreed" that it 
shouldn't have been brought up, but I don't see that there's significant 
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harm. There was no description of any violent events. It was just a brief 
mention." R167:156-57. 
B. Defendant must prove both that the brief, unsolicited, 
and vague comment deprived him of a fair trial and 
that he likely would have been acquitted without it. 
"In view of the practical necessity of avoiding mistrials and getting 
litigation finished," a trial court "should not grant a mistrial except where 
the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate" that" a fair trial cannot 
be had and that a mistrial is necessary to avoid injustice." State v. Butterfield, 
2001 UT 59, ,t46, 27 P.3d 1133 (quotations and citation omitted). Once a trial 
court "has exercised its discretion" to deny a mistrial, this Court's 
"prerogative" on appeal "is much more limited." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless "the 
record clearly shows that the trial court's decision is plainly wrong in that 
the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said 
to have had a fair trial." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). This 
deference recognizes the trial court's "advantaged position" in assessing 
"the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings." 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
Utah case law has consistently held that "a mistrial is not required 
where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made in 
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passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony presented." 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, il40, 108 P.3d 730; accord State v. Milligan, 2012 UT 
App 47, i18, 287 P.3d 1. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
no mistrial was required where a witness's improper reference to the 
defendant's outstanding arrest warrant "was very brief and was only made 
in passing, stating no details of the circumstances which caused the warrant 
to issue or of the offense to which it was related." State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 
879, 883 (Utah 1988). See also State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, i146, 24 P.3d 948 (no 
mistrial required where improper statement "was not elicited by the 
prosecutor and was an isolated, off-hand remark, buried in roughly 244 
pages of testimony"). Likewise, this Court has held that no mistrial was 
required where an officer's improper reference to the defendant's criminal 
history was not intentionally elicited by the prosecutor, was "'made in 
passing,"' and was '"relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony 
presented."' State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254, ili135-36, 262 P.3d 468 
(quoting Allen, 2005 UT 11, il 40 (modification in original)). 
To prove an abuse of discretion, a defendant must do more than show 
that "some prejudice" might have resulted from the improper comment. 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, il 47 (quotations and citation omitted). Rather, the 
"defendant must make some showing that the verdict was substantially 
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influenced by the challenged testimony." Id. (quotations, citation, and 
emphasis omitted). In short, a defendant must "show that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the jury would have found him not guilty had 
the improper statement not been made." Id.; see also State v. Dalton, 2014 UT 
App 68, ,I35, 331 P.3d 1110 (rejecting an appeal from mistrial denial because 
court "not convinced that the verdict was substantially influenced by the 
challenged testimony"). 
Defendant cannot meet his burden on this record. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 
mistrial where the brief, unsolicited, and vague comment 
likely did not influence the verdict. 
The h·ial court properly denied a mistrial based on the victim's 
isolated, vague reference to "getting violent." It was unprompted, made in 
passing, and likely had no effect on the verdict. 
Defendant does not dispute that the comment was unprompted. Br. 
Aplt. 41-44. Indeed, he conceded below that it was "volunteered." 
R167:155. 
More importantly, Defendant has not shown how this two-word 
vague reference to violence likely influenced the verdict. First, it is not at all 
clear that the jury caught the comment. The prosecutor tried to talk over it 
to prevent the jury from hearing it, or at least from seizing on it. R167:155-
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56. And the prosecutor's next question-"You broke up?" -was designed 
to quickly change the subject. R167:92. 
Second, that the comment might have been a reference to prior 
violence acts, likely escaped the jury. The comment contained no 
description of violent events. See Griffiths, 752 P.2d at 883 (mistrial not 
required where improper reference contained no details). And, in the 
context of the victim's testimony that Defendant was always arguing with 
her, "getting violent" could just as easily have meant that he merely yelled 
at her. 
Third, the comment consisted of two words, spoken at the beginning 
of a two-day trial that spanned nearly 300 pages of transcript. See State v. 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, if 46, 24 P.3d 948 (no mistrial required where improper 
statement "was not elicited by the prosecutor and was an isolated, off-hand 
remark, buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony"). The words were not 
mentioned again or otherwise highlighted to the jury. Cf Allen, 2005 UT 11, 
i[37 (concluding no prejudice because "neither party attracted attention" to 
improper statement after it was made). And no other reference to 
Defendant's prior violence was made. 
Finally, given the strength of the State's case, it is unlikely that the 
victim's vague reference to "getting violent" influenced the verdict. The 
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jury heard and saw unrefuted testimonial and physical evidence that the 
victim's backdoor and bathroom door were broken and that they were not 
broken before Defendant showed up that night. The jury heard from both 
the victim and her cousin that two loud bangs immediately preceded 
Defendant's appearance in the house. Both testified that Defendant yelled 
at the victim after he entered. The jury also heard and saw that the tread on 
the Defendant's shoes looked a lot like the shoe impressions in the snow 
and the partial shoe impression on the backdoor. All of this led to the 
reasonable conclusion that Defendant, uninvited, had entered the house and 
the bathroom by kicking in the two doors. It was only a small step from 
there to conclude that Defendant also threatened the victim. 
Given all this evidence, there is not "a substantial likelihood that the 
jury would have found [Defendant] not guilty," but for the victim's passing, 
vague reference to "getting violent." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, if 47. The trial 
court was therefore well within its discretion to deny a mistrial. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine entitles him to 
relief. Utah appellate courts "will reverse a jury verdict under the 
cumulative error doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several errors 
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undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack, 2008 
UT 49, ~56, 191 P.3d 17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ~73, 28 P.3d 
1278) (omission in original). As explained, Defendant has not shown any 
error. His cumulative error claim therefore fails. See id. (rejecting 
cumulative error claim where Killpack failed to demonstrate any error). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on January 27, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
Utah R. Evid. 403. Exclusion Of Relevant Evidence On Grounds Of Prejudice, 
Confusion, Or Waste Of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
" 
Utah R. Evid. 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, 
but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to 
character for truthfulness. 
" (c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
" 
, 
, 
• 
, 
Utah R. Evid. R. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited 
to one that is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in 
issue; and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope 
of Rule 702. 
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